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SPECIAL PROVISIONS

OF TOWAGE CONTRACTS
HARNEY B.

STOVER, JR.*

I. INTRODUCTION

In the United States today there is a growing interest and emphasis on the shipping industry and the benefits that may be derived
from shipments by water. Perhaps the greatest contributing factor to
this increased interest in recent years has been the joint undertaking
and development of the St. Lawrence Seaway by the United States and
Canada. Within the shipping industry itself, towing services play a
vital and necessary role. Almost all of the ports of the United States
are situated in such a manner that, of necessity, at one time or another
ships desiring to use their facilities require towing services. Though
there are many cases dealing with the subject of towage and towage
contracts, writers in the field of Admiralty have felt it unnecessary to
devote much attention to those subjects. The most recent textbook in
the field of Admiralty does not devote much more than six pages to
this subject.' It is with this in mind that the writer now undertakes
to develop in some detail a discussion of certain special provisions in
towage contracts which have caused some degree of controversy over
the years.
II. IN GENERAL
Before actually considering special provisions in towage contracts,
it would be well to have in mind some of the basic premises underlying
the field of towage. The usual definition of towage service is that service renderel by one vessel to expedite the voyage or movement of
another vessel without reference to any circumstances of danger. 2 More
realistically and specifically it has been stated that towage is the supplying of power by a vessel, usually one propelled by steam, or today
by diesel engine, to tow or draw another vessel.3
*The author is a partner in the firm of Stover & Stover, 324 East Wisconsin

Avenue, Milwaukee 2, Wisconsin. The firm of Stover & Stover has been in
existence at Milwaukee, Wisconsin for 66 years and has been engaged to some
degree in the field of Admiralty practice for the past 42 years.
The author is a Fourth Generation Attorney. He went to Brown University
prior to World War II, completed his undergraduate education at Northwestern
University in 1948 and graduated from the University of Michigan Law School
in 1951. He is a member of the State Bar of Michigan and the State Bar of
Wisconsin and has been admitted to practice before the Supreme Court of the
State of Michigan, the Supreme Court of the State of Wisconsin, the United
States District Courts for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, The Eastern District
of Michigan and the Northern District of Illinois and the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
I GILMORE AND BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY, 426-432 (1957).
Sacramento Nay. Co. v. Salz, 273 U.S. 326 (1927); Mississippi Valley Barge
Line Co. v. Indian Towing Co., 232 F. 2d 750, 753 (5th Cir. 1956) ; The Kennebec, 231 Fed. 423, 425 (5th Cir. 1916); The S. C. Schenk, 158 Fed. 54, 59
(6th Cir. 1907); The Nettie Quill, 124 Fed. 667, 670 (S.D. Ala. 1903).
3 Stevens v. The White City, 285 U.S. 195, 200 (1932).
2
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In order to intelligently consider any subject within the field of
towage and towage contracts, one must be able to distinguish between
towage service and salvage service. This can be done by considering
that towage service is the aid rendered in the movement of a vessel
not in distress while salvage service is the aid rendered to a vessel in
distress and in imminent danger of disaster.4 Towage service is a
contractual service,5 whereas true salvage service is a voluntary service
rendered to a vessel in peril to relieve her from present or reasonably
apprehendable danger or distress.6 The necessary elements for true
salvage service are the presence of actual peril or distress, a voluntary
service rendered and either partial or complete success.7 The salvage
itself is compensation in the nature of a reward received for the meritorious services successfully rendered, given so as to encourage others
to do likewise in situations of distress or peril." Of course, salvage
services may also be contractual in which case the amount of the compensation and the conditions upon which it is dependent would be determined by the terms of the contract itself. A change in condiitons
may convert a towing operation into a salvage service or vice versa. 9
"Towing" a vessel is distinguished from "navigating" a vessel in
that the latter means steering, directing or managing a vessel, implying
that such is done by those aboard the vessel itself, while the former
means to drag a vessel through the water by means of a cable or line
attached to another vessel, implying that such is done by those aboard
the other vessel.' 0 Today this would include pushing, as well as pulling
movements, and sternward, as well as forward, movements because as
a practical matter a tug may push or pull her tow in numerous ways
both forward and sternward in accomplishing the purpose of the tow.
Vessels being towed may include barges, canal boats and other vessels
having no motive power of their own such as dredges, rafts, etc., as
well as vessels having motive power of their own such as steamers
which frequently employ auxilliary power in the form of tugs to assist
them in moving about harbors, docks and channels."'
Despite some miscellaneous statements to the contrary, it is gen4The Mercer, 297 Fed. 981, 984 (2d Cir. 1924).
5P.
Dougherty Co. v. U.S., 97 F. Supp. 287, 291 (D.C. Del. 1951), rev'd. on
grounds of negligence, 207 F. 2d 626, cert. denied, 347 U.S. 912.
6 La Rue v. United Fruit Co., 181 F. 2d 895, 898 (4th Cir. 1950) ; The Kennebec,
231 Fed. 423 (5th Cir. 1916); Kittelsa v. U.S., 75 F. Supp. 845, 846 (E.D. N.Y.
1948) ; The Emanuel Stavroudis, 23 F. 2d 214, 216 (Md. 1927).
7Squires v. The Ionian Leader, 100 F. Supp. 829, 834 (N... 1951).
8 La Rue i. United Fruit Co., 181 F. 2d 895, 898 (4th Cir. 1950) ; U.S. v. The
James L. Richards, 179 F. 2d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1950) ; Steamer Avalon Co. v.
Hubbard S.S. Co., 255 Fed. 854, 856 (9th Cir. 1919) ; J. M. Guffey Petroleum
Co. v. Dorison, 211 Fed. 594, 601 (5th Cir. 1914).
9 Geertson v. U.S., 223 F. 2d 68 (3d Cir. 1955).
0

1

Ryan v. Hook, 34 Hun. (N.Y.) 185 (1884).
White City, 285 U.S. 195 (1932) ; also see 1 BENEDICT, ADMIRALTY, §100 (6th ed.), p. 306.

11 Stevens v. The
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erally conceded by American Courts that the towing vessel or tug is
not a common carrier or insurer or bailee of the tow, 12 and owes to

the tow that degree of care and skill in the management of the towing
vessel and in the conduct of the towing operation as is ordinarily employed by prudent navigators under the same or similar circumstances."
In the many opinions covering the subject there appears to be conflict
as to whether the care required is reasonable care, ordinary care or a
high degree of care. It seems safe to say that there actually is no conflict but that the terms reasonable and ordinary are synonymous under
the circumstances. Mention of a high degree of care as that being required can usually be reconciled with other statements in that the ordinary or reasonable care required is actually the exercise of a high
degree of skill as compared to the skill required in other fields, but
within the field of navigation it is the ordinary or reasonable care employed by prudent navigators under the same or similar circumstances.
Just as it is implied that the towing vessel will conform to a standard
of care in performing its functions in connection with the towage operation, so also is it implied that the tow will conform to the same
standard of care in its conduct of the operation,'14 dependent upon the
nature of the vessel being towed. For example, in open waters with a
single towing vessel pulling, it is the duty of the tow to follow the
guidance of the towing vessel, keep within her wake as much as possible and conform to her directions.' 5 So also, a steamer in tow is not
relieved of the duty to maintain a proper and competent lookout and

6
to warn of any impending danger.'

The extent of the assistance required of the towing vessel varies
under the circumstances of the tow. Assistance rendered to a dead,
unmanned tow would differ considerably from that rendered to a live,
loaded steamer fully manned and with power and helm available. The
condition of the tow and the circumstances surrounding the towing
operation might very well include a light, partially loaded or loaded
tow, an unmanned, partially manned or fully manned tow from a barge
without any rudder or power up to a steamer with full power and
rudder available, the use of one, two or more towing vessels or an
12 Sun Oil Co. v. Dalzell Towing Co., 287 U.S. 291 (1932); Stevens v. The White
City, 285 U.S. 195 (1932); The Margaret, 94 U.S. 494 (1877); The Webb, 14
Wall. 406 (1871) ; The Syracuse, 12 Wall. 171 (1871) ; The W. H. Baldwin,
271 F. 411 (2d Cir. 1921).
13 See Annot: 54 A.L.R. 104-108; Southwestern Sugar & Molasses Co. v. River
Terminals Corp., 153 F. Supp. 923 (E.D. La. 1957); Foss Launch & Tug Company v. The Kukui, 130 F. Supp. 180 (N.D. Cal. 1955).
14 The Wk.J. Keyser, 56 Fed. 731, 734 (5th Cir. 1893).
'5 The Margaret, 94 U.S. 494 (1877).
16 Stevens v. The White City, 285 U.S. 195 (1932) ; Reiss S.S. Co. v. Great Lakes
Towing Co., 177 F. 2d 681 (8th Cir. 1949); Great Lakes Towing Co. v. American S.S. Co., 165 F. 2d 368 (6th Cir. 1948) ; The Vale Royal, 51 F. Supp. 412
(Md. 1943); The Coleraine, 179 Fed. 977 (E.D.N.Y. 1910).
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operation taking place in open waters as opposed to towage in narrow
channels. Suffice it to say that any one or a combination of these factors
will vary the amount of assistance required to complete the towing operation successfully and will vary the extent of the responsibility of
the towing vessel and the tow.
In strange waters the master of the towing vessel is held to that
degree of skill and knowledge required of prudent navigators operating
in such waters, as indicated before. In its home port a towing vessel
is bound to know and chargeable with knowledge of channels, depth
of water, currents and tide, condition of the bottom and existing and
well known obstructions, whether charted or uncharted, 17 and even recently changed conditions in channels and harbors if means of knowledge exist and are available to it.2s However, the master of a towing

vessel, even in its home port, is not presumed or bound to know uncharted, unmarked, hidden and dangerous obstructions to navigation of
which he has no notice or knowledge.' 9
A towage contract is no different than any other contract" in that
it must contain the essential elements of offer, acceptance and consideration. As a practical matter, the contract may be made in many different
ways. There may be a specific written contract covering the tow of
one vessel by another from one point to another or covering towing
operations for an entire season or year in hauling certain cargoes.
But the contract need not be in writing.2 Frequently, a towage contract
is made when a vessel entering a harbor and requiring assistance to a
dock, signals for a tug and the tug comes alongside and takes the
vessel's line. The towing operation actually commences when the towing vessel takes the tow line. 22 Large towing companies may publish
tariffs covering the operations of their towing vessels in various ports
and send copies of such tariffs to shipping companies operating vessels
in those ports. Availing themselves of the services of such towing
vessels binds both tug and tow to the terms, conditions and rates set
2 3
forth in the tariff unless there is a specific agreement otherwise.
The relation ordinarily existing between tug and tow may be
changed by agreement between the parties." It is such specific proT
The WA
. H. Baldwin, 271 Fed. 411 (2d Cir. 1921); Vessel Owners' Towing Co.
v. WAilson, 63 Fed. 626 (7th Cir. 1894).
Is Great Lakes Towing Co. v. Alva S.S. Co., 261 Fed. 261, 262 (7th Cir. 1919).
19 The Arlington, 10 F. 2d 285 (2d Cir. 1927) ; The W. H. Baldwin, 271 Fed. 411
(2d Cir. 1921) ; The Westerly, 249 Fed. 938 (1st Cir. 1918) ; The Louisa, 215
Yed. 92 (2d Cir. 1914); Maxon v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 122 Fed. 555
(E.D.Wis. 1903).
20 Clark v Gifford, 7 La. 524, 26 Am. Dec. 511 (1835).
21The Marmor, 56 F. Supp. 435, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
22 Midland Steamship Line v. The Arkansas, 232 F. 2d 81 (6th Cir. 1956).
23Hand & Johnson Tug Line v. Canada S.S. Lines, 281 Fed. 779 (6th Cir. 1922).
24 Wells & Tucker v. The Steam Navigation Co., 2 N.Y. 204, 1 Seld. 132 (1849).
'2
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visions or agreements changing the ordinary relationship existing between tug and tow which are now to be considered.
III. COMPENSATION

Most towing operations are conducted in accordance with a towage
contract or tariff which prescribes the rates to be charged and paid for
the services performed. In the absence of an agreement as to rates or
price for the towage services performed, the towboat is entitled to receive a "reasonable compensation" for its services.2 5 In the case of a
towboat ordinarily engaged in rendering towing services, the standard
followed would involve consideration of the running expenses of the
towboat and the general custom as to rates and charges for similar
services.2 " In determining what is reasonable compensation for extraordinary towage services performed, but short of salvage, there may
be taken into consideration the type of vessel rendering the towing
service, the time spent, the danger involved and the value of the towing
vessel and her cargo. 27 Money expended to acquire additional assistance
to complete the towing operation, where such is required through no
fault on the part of the towing vessel, is chargeable to the tow. 2 8

Since a towing vessel engaged in rendering towing services is not
a common carrier, rates for towage services may be set by contract
without regard to rates established by a state for common carriers.2 9
However, in at least one instance, a towing company has grown so
large in its operations within a certain area as to become virtually
monopolistic within that area, and, as an alternative to dissolution by
virtue of an anti-trust action, has been required to annually publish
and post a tariff in order to continue the operation of its business.3 0
An agreement in a towage contract or in the tariff under which the
services are performed as to the amount chargeable fixes that as the
amount recoverable and to be paid.3 1 Compensation for towage services is recoverable even despite delay due to a reasonable deviation or
injury to the tow where such results without any fault on the part of
25 Curtis Bay Towing Co. v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 54 F. Supp. 988 (E.D. Penn.

1943), affd. 142 F. 2d 257 (3d Cir. 1944) ; The Oswego No. 2, 23 F. Supp. 311
IW.D.N.Y. 1938); The J. C. Pfluger, 109 Fed. 93 (N.D. Cal. 1901).
268Curtis Bay Towing Co. v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 54 F. Supp. 988 (E.D. Penn.
1943), affd. 142 F. 2d 257 (3d Cir. 1944); Syson v. Hieronymus, 127 Ala. 482,

i8 So. 967 (1900).
The Viola, 52 Fed. 172 (C.C.E.D. Penn. 1892); The J. C. Pfluger, 109 Fed.
93 (N.D. Cal. 1901).
28 Foss Launch & Tug Company v. The Kukui, 130 F. Supp. 180 (N.D. Cal. 1955).
29 State of Washington ex rel. Stimson Lumber Co. v. Kuykendall, 275 U.S.
207 (1927).
30 U.S. v. Great Lakes Towing Co., 208 Fed. 733 (N.D. Ohio 1913), supplementary
decision 217 Fed. 656 (N.D. Ohio 1914).
31 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. M. McGirr's Sons Co., 287 Fed. 334 (2d Cir. 1922),
cert. denied, 262 U.S. 743; Foss Launch &Tug Company v. The Kukui, 130 F.
Supp. 180 (N.D. Cal. 1955); The Enterprise, 181 Fed. 746 (W.D. Penn. 1910).
27
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the towing vessel.3 2 When agreed upon and not due to any fault of
the towing vessel, loss of the tow does not affect the compensation
due.33 Of course, damages resulting from delay of, injury to or loss
of the tow due to the negligence of the towing vessel would be the
proper subject of a claim against the tower.
The parties to a towage contract may make any agreement as to
the time and method of payment. In the absence of such an agreement, payment for towage services is not due until the services have
been rendered, unless there is a custom of the port otherwise and such
custom is binding upon the parties.34
IV. PILOTAGE

Pilots can generally be classified into two categories; those entrusted
with the navigation of a vessel throughout the course of a voyage, and
those employed to guide a vessel in and out of harbors, rivers and specified channels. The degree of skill required by the two classes differs.
The former requires a knowledge and application of the applicable
rules of navigation, the use of particular charts to avoid dangers, and
the use of navigational observations and aids to complete a successful
voyage from departure to destination. The latter requires a personal,
thorough, up-to-date knowledge of the channels, currents, obstructions
and dangers, charted or uncharted, of the locale.3 5 It is the latter use
of a pilot which is generally the subject of a pilotage provision in a
towage contract. As a practical matter the pilot in such instances may
take the helm of the vessel and actually steer her course or may stand
by the wheelsman and direct the navigation of the vessel. In either
case, he is generally conceded by American authorities to supersede
the master as far as the navigation of the vessel is concerned. 8
The usual pilotage provision in a towing contract provides that the
master of a towing vessel who goes aboard a tow, using her own propelling power, to pilot her becomes the servant of the tow or her
owners and that the towing vessel and her owners are not liable for his
negligent pilotage. The leading case in this field is Sun Oil Co v. Dalzell Towing Co. 37

In that case the United States Supreme Court con-

sidered a situation wherein the owner of a tank steamer brought an
action against the owner of three tugs and the tugs themselves for
damages to the steamer when she was grounded while the tugs were
assisting her through the waters leading to Newark Bay and to a dock
at Bergen Point, New Jersey. At the time of the grounding, the
32

Atlantic & Gulf Shipping Co. v. Marine Contracting & Towing Co., 26 F. 2d
70 (5th Cir. 1928).
33Foss Launch & Tug Company v. The Kukui, 130 F. Supp. 180 (N.D. Cal. 1955).
34The Queen of the East, 12 Fed. 165 (C.C.E.D. La. 1882).
35 Atlee v. Northwestern Union Packet Co., 21 Wall. (U.S.) 389 (1875) ; Pacific
fail S.S. Co. v. Joliffe, 2 Wall. (U.S.) 450 (1865).
36 The Oregon, 158 U.S. 186 (1895).
37287 U.S. 291 (1932).
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master of one of the tugs was aboard the tank steamer acting as pilot.
Though there was no written or formal towage contract and the agreement was formed by an oral order and acceptance via telephone in
accordance with prior like transactions between the parties, it was
agreed that the contract contained as one of its terms a clause providing that when the captain of one of the tugs towing a vessel using
her own propelling power was aboard the vessel, he was to become the
servant of the vessel's owners in regard to giving orders to any of the
tugs or handling the vessel. The Court, in considering whether the
tugs and their owners were liable for the negligent pilotage of the tug
captain aboard the tank steamer, stated as follows:
"When the captain of any tug engaged in the services of
towing a vessel which is making use of her own propelling power
goes on board said vessel, it is understood and agreed that said
tugboat captain becomes the servant of the owners in respect to
the giving of orders to any of the tugs engaged in the towing
service and in respect to the handling of such vessel, and neither
the tugs nor their owners or agents shall be liable for any damages resulting therefrom."
The Court held that the pilotage clause was valid and that the owner
of the tugs was exempt from liability for negligent pilotage by the tug
captain while aboard the steamer as pilot. The basis for this decision
was given as the fact that the tugs were not common carriers or bailees,
since towage does not involve the liability of common carriers or bailees.
Since pilotage is something even less than towage and there was no
monopoly present in respect of services desired by the steamer, the
Court held that the parties were on an equal footing and dealt at arms
length and that public policy required enforcement of the contract
actually made.
That this rule is still in full force and effect today is clearly established by two recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court,
Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp.38 and Boston Metals Co. v. The
Winding Gulf,39 which specifically referred to The Sun Oil Case as
valid and binding law. However, it is apparent from the latter case
that such provisions are to be strictly construed and apply only to cases
of pilotage in the true sense of the word and cannot be used in an attempt to establish an exemption from all liability for negligent towage.
That such provisions will be strictly construed is even more apparent
from the decision of the Court in United States v. Nielson,40 wherein
the Court held that a pilotage clause releasing from liability for damages resulting from the negligence of the tugman acting as pilot by
making him an employee of the tow owner, could not be construed to
38349 U.S. 85 (1955).
39349

U.S. 122 (1955).

40349 U.S. 129 (1955).
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entitle the tug owner to collect for damages to the tug resulting from
the negligence of the tugman-pilot aboard the tow. The Court did
state, however, that "clear contractual language might justify imposition of such liability."
There can be little doubt but that a pilotage provision of the type
discussed herein is valid, binding and enforceable as between the parties
to a towage contract. Disregarding all arguments concerning whether
or not towing vessels are common carriers, insurers or bailees, whether
or not one should be able to contract against liabiilty for his own negligence or that of his employees and whether or not the towing operations involved are in the nature of a monopoly, the real reason and
basis for upholding the validity of a pilotage provision probably lies in
the fact that furnishing pilotage is not a part of towage. The vessel in
tow could just as easily obtain the services of a pilot other than the
master of the towing vessel and in any case the pilot would, for all
intents and purposes, become the servant of the owner of the tow if
he was piloting her with the use of her own propelling power, probably
even in the absence of any special provision in the contract as to pilotage. Accordingly, the parties are unquestionably dealing on an equal
basis and there is no reason of public policy or otherwise preventing
the owner of a towing vessel from exempting himself and his vessel
from liability for damage incurred as a result of the negligence of his
tug captain while actually serving as pilot for and servant of the owner
of the vessel in tow.
V.

DEMMURAGE

Towing contracts and the tariffs of towing companies frequently
contain a provision to the effect that the amount chargeable for demurrage to a towing vessel and her owners in case of liability on the
part of the towing vessel shall be limited to a certain amount per day.
Such restrictive limitations usually contain the provision that the limit
may be increased upon notice and payment of increased rates.
That such a limitation is valid and binding as between the parties
to a towage contract was firmly established in Hand & Johnson Tug
Boat Line v. Canada S.S. Lines41 wherein the Court considered a
situation involving a tug pushing a steamer toward a dock. The
steamer was moving sternward and the tug and the steamer were
lashed port bow to port bow. The steamer's stern hit the dock. The
tug owner was a subsidiary of The Great Lakes Towing Company. By
Court order in an anti-trust action brought by the United States against
The Great Lakes Towing Company, the towing company was required
to publish and post a tariff annually in order to continue the operation
of its business. The towing company did this and Canada S.S. Lines
had received previous tariffs. The latest one prior to the accident in
4' 281 Fed. 779 (6th Cir. 1922).
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question was mailed from the towing company's general office in Cleveland to the steamship company's general office in Montreal marked for
the "Accounting Office." Copies were also sent to the steamship company's office in Toronto. The latter were admittedly received but the
former could not be found and the steamship company claimed that
they were never received. The tariff contained a restrictive provision
limiting the amount chargeable for demurrage in case of the tug's
liability to One Hundred Dollars per day with a provision for increase
in limitation upon notice and payment of increased rates of 5% for
each One Hundred Dollars per day increase. The lower Court held
the tug at fault and the provision limiting demurrage invalid and ineffective and allowed demurrage of Three Hundred Dollars per day.
The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed that the tug was at fault but
upheld the demurrage provision on the ground that if a demurrage
liability limitation is valid for common carriers, which are closer to
the position of insurers than tugs which are not common carriers, then
the demurrage liability limitation was valid. The Court further held
that if the tariff was received, the towing company had the right to
assume that any request for towing was made pursuant to the offer
and conditions contained in the tariff and the steamship company could
not deny the conditions therein.
Subsequent cases have uniformly upheld the validity and enforceability of such demurrage limitations.4 2 As was stated in The Hand &
Johnson Tug Line Case, the underlying reason for enforcing such provisions is probably that they are upheld in the case of common carriers,43 and vessels engaged in towing operations are something less
than common carriers. It follows that they should be valid and enforceable as applied to towage operations.
It should be pointed out that all such provisions which have been
upheld have not sought to exempt or release the towing vessel from
all liability but rather have sought only to limit the towing vessel's
liability. Further, it should be pointed out that all such clauses uniformly
provide for an increase in the limitation upon payment of higher rates.
It is doubtful that any such provision which limits liability to a certain
sum per day for demurrage, without any provision for increase in that
amount upon payment of higher rates, would be held to be valid and
enforceable.
VI.

RELEASE FROM LIABILITY

Release-from-liability provisions in towage contracts have been the
subject of considerable judicial discussion over a period of many
42 Great Lakes Towing Co. v. Bethlehem Transp. Corp., 65 F. 2d 543 (6th Cir.
1933) ; The Texas, 27 F. 2d 162 (W.D.N.Y. 1928).
4 Union Pacific R. Co. v. Burke, 255 U.S. 317 (1921); Reid v. American Express
Co., 241 U.S. 554 (1916).
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years. Such clauses may provide that the towing operation is undertaken at the sole risk of the tow, or that the vessel in tow is to assume
all risk, or that the towing vessel and her owners are to be exempt from
liability for negligence on the part of the towing vessel, her officers
and crew, or that the officers and crew of the towing vessel are to be
deemed employees of the owner and operator of the tow. In 1871, in
The Steamboat Syracuse v. Thomas Langley,4 4 the United States Supreme Court considered a situation wherein a canal boat, being towed
by a steamer, was crushed and lost. The contract of towage provided
that the tow would bear the risks of navigation provided the steamer,
which furnished the propulsive power, was navigated with ordinary
care and skill. The Court found in favor of the canal boat and the
following appeared in the syllabus of the case:
"Although by special agreement, a canal-boat was being
towed at her own risk, nevertheless, the steamer towing the canalboat is liable, if, through the negligence of those in charge of her,
the canal-boat has suffered loss."
That such language appeared in the syllabus was unfortunate, because
the actual decision of the Court stated as follows:
"It is unnecessary to consider the evidence relating to the
alleged contract of towage, because, if it be true, as the appellant
says, that, by special agreement, the canal-boat was being towed
at her own risk, nevertheless, the steamer is liable, if, through
the negligence of those in charge of her, the canal-boat has
suffered loss."
The decision shows that the Court actually never decided whether or
not the steamer could exempt herself from liability by contract because, if negligent, in either case, she was liable and she had been found
negligent. The decision itself would appear to be merely an interpretation of the contract but the statement in the syllabus went further.
In 1909, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
The Oceanica 5 considered an agreement made between a tug and tow,
absolving the tug from liability in case of damage to the tow, i.e., the
tow to assume all risk. The court stated that "a tug is not, in relation
to its tow, a common carrier, being only bound to the exercise of
ordinary care" and that "it follows that a contract against liability for
negligence cannot be construed in the case of a tug as it may be in the
case of a common carrier." The Court then went on to firmly establish
a rule that a towing vessel may by contract exempt itself and its owners
from liability for negligence on the part of the towing vessel, its
officers and crew.
The apparent discrepancy between the decisions in The Syracuse
and The Oceanica caused a complete divergence of opinion on the
4479 U.S. (12
rall.) 167 (1871).
45 170 Fed. 893 (2d Cir. 1909), cert. denied, 215 U.S. 599 (1909).
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subject. A number of jurisdictions followed what was considered to
be the lead of the decision in The Syracuse and held release-fromliability provisions in towage contracts to be void and unenforceable.46
The courts in the Second Circuit and a few other courts uniformly
held that such provisions in towage contracts were valid and enforceable.4 7 Even leading writers in the field of admiralty differed as to
4
validity of such provisions.
In 1928 the question again indirectly came before the United States
Supreme Court in The Walsh Gray.40 In that instance the towage contract provided that, other than furnishing a hawser, "all other risk and
expense to be borne by the tug" (tow) and that the towing vessel
would not be responsible in any way for loss or damage to the tow.
The tow was damaged and sunk due to the negligence of the master
and crew of the towing vessel. The owner of the tow had insurance
and attempted to recover for his damage under the insurance contracts. The insurance companies claimed that the clause in the towage
contract exempted the tower from liability and so the insurance companies would have no right of subrogation against the tower. Since
the clause in the towage contract was not disclosed at the time that the
insurance contracts were written, the insurance companies claimed that
the policies were void because they never would have written policies
for such liability. The Court held that the clause was ineffective so
that the insurance companies would have a right of subrogation against
the tower and therefor should pay under the policies. The courts of the
Second Circuit again considered that this was merely an interpretation
of the contract and continued to follow the rule established in The
Oceanica.
The entire situation came to a head in 1955 when the United States
Supreme Court rendered its decision in Bisso v. Inland Waterways
50
Corporation.
The situation considered therein involved an oil barge
which was being towed up the Mississippi River by a steam tug. The
46 The American Eagle, 54 Fed. 1010 (N.D. Ohio 1893); The Somers N. Smith,

120 Fed. 569 (D.C. Maine 1903); Alaska Commercial Co. v. Williams, 128 Fed.
362 (9th Cir. 1904) ; Mylorie v. British Columbia Mills Tug & Barge Co., 268
Fed. 449 (9th Cir. 1920) ; The Sea Lion, 12 F. 2d 124 (N.D. Cal. 1926) ; Great
Lakes Towing Co. v. American S.S. Co., 165 F. 2d 368 (6th Cir. 1948) ; The
Walter G. Hougland, 184 F. 2d 530 (6th Cir. 1950).
47 Ten Eyck v. Director General of Railroads, 267 Fed. 974 (2d Cir. 1920) The
Cutchogue, 10 F. 2d 671 (2d Cir. 1926); The Mercer, 14 F. 2d 488 (E.D.N.Y.
1926); The Melvin and Mary, 23 F. Supp. 398 (E.D.N.Y. 1938); Peterson
Lighterage & Towing Corp. v. The J. Raymond Russell, 87 F. Supp. 467
(S.D.N.Y. 1949); North River Barge Line v. Chile S.S. Co., 213 F. 2d 882
(2d Cir. 1954) ; The Pacific Maru, 8 F. 2d 166 (S.D. Ga. 1925).
48 ROBINSON, ADMIRALTY §91, p. 672 (1939), stating that such a provision is not
valid; 1 BENEDIcT, ADMIRALTY, §100, pp. 307-308 (6th ed.), stating that a towage
contractor may by contract limit or disclaim liability for negligence.
49 Reported as Compania de Navegacion, Interior, S.A. v. Firemen's Fund Ins.
Co., 277 U.S. 66 (1928).
o See note 38 supra.
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barge had no motive power, steering apparatus, officers or crew and
was under the complete control of the tug. Negligent towage by the
tug caused the barge to collide with a bridge pier and sink. The contract between the tug and the barge provided that the towing operation was to be done "at the sole risk" of the tow and that the master,
crew and employees of the tug should "in the performance of said service, become and be the servants" of the barge owners. The District
Court upheld the validity of the contractual provision exempting the
tug owner from liability for the negligence of the tug and entered a
judgment for the tug owner. 5 The Court of Appeals held both clauses
5 2
valid and affirmed the judgment of the District Court.

The Supreme Court held that The Syracuse and The Walsh Gray
determined that towboat owners could not be permitted "by contract
wholly to escape liability for their own negligent towing." On this
basis both clauses of the contract were held invalid as attempting to
shift all liability for negligent towage from the tower to the tow. The
rule of the Second Circuit established in The Oceanica was impliedly
overruled. The rule of The Sun Oil Case upholding the validity of
pilotage provisions was specifically considered and left untouched, being
distinguished as merely upholding a pilotage clause while The Bisso
Case concerned a towage exemption-from-liability clause. The reasons
given as a basis for the decision in The Bisso Case were, as a matter of
public policy, "to discourage negligence by making wrongdoers pay
damages" and "to protect those in need of goods or services from being
overreached by others who have power to drive hard bargains," the
implication being that many of the aspects of the towing business were
somewhat monopolistic.
The decision of the Supreme Court in The Bisso Case is, at best,
a weak decision in the sense that the majority opinion, written by
Justice Black, was a four-man opinion. Justice Harlan took no part in
the consideration or decision of the case. Justice Douglas concurred
with the opinion of the four-man majority but indicated that if conditions are now such that vessels in tow are in a better position to assume
the risks than the towing industry, then the public policy might be different and the rule should be changed. He stated that this would require an economic brief which was not submitted in The Bisso Case.
Justice Frankfurter, with Justices Reed and Burton joining him, dissented and stated that the rule of the Second Circuit in The Oceanica
should be the prevailing rule. Following the decision in The Bisso Case,
the Supreme Court rendered a decision in Boston Metals Company v.
The S.S. Winding Gulf5 3 holding a pilotage clause invalid as actually
51114
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F. Supp. 713 (E.D. La. 1953).
F. 2d 401 (5th Cir. 1954).

5 See note 39 supra.
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an exemption-from-liability clause in that the vessel in tow in the
situation considered therein was a dead, unmanned, obsolete destroyer.
This case in no way overruled The Sun Oil Case but rather distinguished pilotage from towage and ruled against doing indirectly what
could not be done directly in seeking to release from negligent towage
by means of a pilotage clause. Towage is not pilotage and the Court
recognized that fact.
It is interesting to note that any mention of a release-from-liability
provision in The Bisso Case refers to a release from all liability.
"The question presented is whether a tow boat may validly
'5 4
contract against all liability for its own negligent towage.
"The Steamer Syracuse, The Walsh Gray and intervening
lower court cases together strongly point to the existence of a
judicial rule, based on public poilcy, invalidating contracts releasing towers from all liability for their negligence." 55
"Thus, holding the pilotage contract valid in The Sun Oil
Case in no way conflicts with the rule against permitting towers
by contracts wholly to escape liability for their own negligent

towing. "56
Strict construction of the majority decision in The Bisso Case would
indicate that the rule against release-from-liability provisions in towage
contracts is a rule against provisions providing for exemption from all
liability for negligent towage. There is no mention of any rule to
prohibit the limitation of liability for negligent towage in a towage
contract and, in fact, the decisions as to demurrage provisions indicate
that a proper limitation of liability provision would be upheld.
From this it is quite apparent that there is nothing presently in the
law to prohibit the owners of towing vessels from limiting their liability
and the liability of their vessels for negligent towage to specified
amounts. Of course, to insure the validity and enforceability of such
provisions, it would probably be both wise and necessary to include a
provision that the amount to which the liability is limited may be increased in accordance with proper written notice and payment of increased rates. It is quite probable that the increases in limitation would
have to be graduated to corresponding increases in rates with a top
limit of no less than the actual damage incurred by the vessel in tow
or the tower's legal liability under the United States Statutes 5 7 or otherwise, whichever is less, and without rate increases so substantial as to
be prohibitive in order to obviate any argument that the clause in effect
provides for exemption from all liabiilty.
VII. FAILURE TO GIVE NOTICE
Many towage contracts and towing company tariffs include a pro54 349 U.S. 85.
55 349 U.S. 85, 95.
56 349 U.S. 85, 94.
57 Limitation of Liability Statutes, 46 U.S.C.A. §183-189.
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vision to the effect that notice of intention to make claim for damage
or injury sustained by a vessel being assisted or towed in accordance
with the contract or tariff must be presented to the owners of the towing
vessel in writing within a reasonable time, not to exceed a specified
number of days, from the date of the occurrence on which the claim
is based, failing which presentation of written notice the claim will be
barred. That such provisions are valid and enforceable is clear from
the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
in Midland Steamship Line, Inc. v. The Tug Arkansas.58 There the
Court considered a clause in the tariff of The Great Lakes Towing
Company similar to that mentioned above and upheld its validity. The
Court stated as follows:
"Also appellant claims that paragraph 16 of the tariff violates public policy, but we agree with the District Court that the
provision is valid and enforceable. While a towboat owner may
not validly contract against all liability for his negligence, Bisso
v. Inland Waterways Corporation,349 U.S. 85, common carriers
may impose just and reasonable limitation upon common-law
liability not amounting to an exemption from the consequences
of their own negligence,***."
While it is unfortunate that the language of "common carriers"
crept into the decision of the Court, it is clear that a failure to give
notice provision of the type suggested herein should be and is valid and
enforceable. The underlying reason for upholding the validity of such
provisions is probably one of public policy. If the owner of a towing
vessel is not given proper and timely notice of claim for damages sustained during towing operations, it is conceivable that the owner of a
vessel in tow could attribute to a single accident damages resulting from
numerous unrelated causes in an effort to collect for all repairs. Without timely notice and an opportunity to conduct a thorough and up-todate investigation of the claim and the accident in question, the owner
of the towing vessel and the vessel itself are literally at the mercy of
the owner of the tow. From this, it stands to reason that the owner
of the towing vessel is entitled to receive timely notice of any claim
for damage or injury to the vessel in tow and that failure to give such
timely notice in accordance with a reasonable contractual provision
therefor not only should but will bar any claim therefor.
VIII. OPPORTUNITY To EXAMINE DAMAGE
In addition to the failure to give notice provision, towage contracts
and tariffs frequently include a provision to the effect that the owner,
operator, charterer or person in control of the vessel in tow which has
met with disaster shall, within a reasonable time after the occurrence
which is the basis of the claim and before repairs are made, give rea58 See note 22 supra.
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sonable opportunity to the tower to examine the damaged property in
order to ascertain the nature and extent of the damage and that failure
to give such opportunity for internal and external inspection shall bar
any claim or suit in regard thereto. The writer knows of no decisions
having been rendered concerning the validity or interpretation of such
a provision in a towage contract. However, it is reasonable to assume
that such a provision is analogous to a provision in regard to failure
to give notice. The reasoning of The Midland Steamship Line Case
should apply as well to an opportunity to examine damage provision
as to a failure to give notice provision. Without a reasonable opportunity to examine the damage prior to repairs, the owner of the towing
vessel and the towing vessel itself are at the mercy of the owner of the
vessel in tow since the latter could attribute to one accident damages
resulting from other unrelated disasters.
As a practical matter, such a provision could cause considerable
trouble and should be interpreted by the Courts at some future time.
Does such a provision mean that the towing vessel and her owner
should have a reasonable opportunity to have the damage examined
and surveyed by a competent marine surveyor, or should such a provision be reduced in meaning to include little more than observation
of the damage by the master of the towing vessel? These questions
are unanswered. In order to forestall any argument on this point, it
would probably be well for towers to include in their towage contracts
and tariffs a provision that a reasonable opportunity to examine damage
is to be interpreted as meaning a reasonable opportunity for the tower
to have a competent marine surveyor examine the damage on his behalf.
It is customary for a vessel owner to notify a tower ahead of time
that the vessel is to be taken into dry dock at a certain time for repairs,
some of which may be attributable to accidents in which the tower may
have an interest, so as to enable the tower to have a marine surveyor
present, prior to the repairs, to survey the damage. It is in instances
where this custom is not followed or where immediate repairs are
made that trouble arises and such a provision becomes applicable.
There is little doubt but that a provision of this type, properly worded
to include a reasonable opportunity for examination of damages by a
competent marine surveyor on behalf of the tower, would be considered
binding, valid and enforceable as between the parties to a towage
contract.
IX.

ICE DAMAGE

In the face of ice conditions, the towing vessel owes its tow the
duty to perform the towing operation "in a seamanlike manner," 59 or,
as indicated earlier, to exercise that degree of care in the conduct of
50 Rice v.The Marion A. C. Meseck, 148 F. 2d 522 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied,
326 U.S. 740.
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the towing operation as is ordinarily employed by prudent navigators
under the same or similar circumstances. In a normal towing operation,
there is no justification for towing in such ice and under such conditions
and in such a manner as to make the operation dangerous. 60
Towing contracts usually contain a provision whereby the towing
vessel and her owner are released from liability for damage caused
by ice to the vessel in tow. The primary difficulty with such a provision is that it is capable of being used, like the pilotage provision, as
a subterfuge to attempt to circumvent the rule against exemption from
all liability for negligent towage established in The Bisso Case, discussed before. That such a provision is valid and enforceable is clearly
set forth by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
in North River Barge Line v. Chile S.S. Co.61 Unfortunately however, that case was decided prior to The Bisso Case and the Court
went off on a discussion of the rules of The Oceanica and The Syracuse and affirmed its earlier decision in The Oceanica and upheld the
ice damage provision. This was unnecessary because the operation was
undertaken at the specific request of the charterer of the tow with full
knowledge of the ice conditions present. There really should have been
no question as to negligent towage because the letter containing the
contractual provision declining liability for ice damage specifically
stated that the tower was not freed "from other liabilities customarily
assumed by the tower." The Court, however, held that the tug was
freed from all liability for ice damage, whether or not on account of
its negligence.
In their practical application, as in The North River Barge Line
Case, ice damage provisions frequently can be misinterpreted and misapplied. Since most ice conditions in connection with towage operations arise in shallow waters, along with the ice damage question there
usually is presented a question concerning negligent navigation. Was
the master of the towing vessel performing the towing operation "in
a seamanlike manner" in navigating those waters in the first place?
Since The Bisso Case only prohibits an exemption by the tower
from all liability for negligent towage, it seems safe to say that an ice
damage provision will be upheld as valid and enforceable in the absence of negligence. It also should be upheld as valid and enforceable
even in the presence of negligence where the towing operation is undertaken at the instance of the vessel in tow with full knowledge of
the dangers present on the part of the owners and operators of the
vessel in tow and the negligence consists solely of undertaking a towing
operation under the conditions then present. In any event, an ice
60 Monkv. Cornell Steamboat Co., 198 F. 472 (2d Cir. 1912) ; Conners-Standard

Marine Corp. v. Oil Transfer Corp., 120 F. Supp. 180 (E.D.N.Y. 1953); The
Rambler, 66 Fed. 355 (S.D.N.Y. 1895).
61213 F. 2d 822 (2d Cir. 1954).

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

damage provision, worded in a manner similar to that suggested in
connection with a release-from-liability provision, should be valid and
enforceable.
X. SUMMARY

From the foregoing, it is clear that contractual provisions between
the parties to a towage contract as to compensation are to be construed
literally and in the absence of such provisions the custom of the locale
will prevail. Reasonable demurrage limitations and pilotage provisions
are valid and enforceable, though the latter will be construed strictly
and applied only to instances of true pilotage. Contractual exemptions
from all liability for negligent towage are void. There is some likelihood that, upon proper presentation and reconsideration at some time
in the future, the present rule against the validity of such release-fromliability provisions will be changed. Carefully and properly worded
provisions limiting liability on a reasonable basis, barring claims upon
failure to give reasonable notice in regard thereto and a reasonable
opportunity to examine the damage which is the subject of the claim
prior to repairs, and limiting claims for ice damage or barring such
claims, except where the ice damage is caused by negligent towage
other than undertaking the operation under the conditions then present.
are valid and enforceable.

